



FROM ICONOLOGY TO ICONOPHOLOGY: A PARADIGMATIC CHANGE

Prof. Dr. Jack Brandão¹

RESUMO – O presente artigo propõe uma nova abordagem da leitura de textos de períodos extemporâneos e, para isso, fez-se necessário criar um novo termo que correspondesse a essa expectativa: a iconofotologia. Para que um leitor contemporâneo possa ler e compreender textos retóricos dos séculos XVI, XVII e XVIII, teria de ter acesso a chaves signílicas a que somente seus leitores tinham acesso: as iconologias. No entanto, esse referencial se perdeu, por isso o substituímos por um outro, a partir do acervo imagético-fotográfico de que dispomos hoje e que chamamos de iconofotológico. A partir dele, será possível lermos, sob o ponto de vista contemporâneo (não sob o ponto de vista seiscentista, por exemplo), os poemas que denominamos fotográficos.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Iconofotologia, iconologia, fotografia.

ABSTRACT – The present article intends to give a new approach to the reading of texts of the extemporaneous periods and, for that, it was necessary to create a new term that corresponded to this expectation: iconophotology. Reading and understanding images and rhetorical texts from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, a reader would have to have access to signs keys to which only readers of that moment had access: the iconologies. However, such referential has been lost; therefore, we have to replace it with another one, from our imagetic-photographic collection, which we call iconophotological.

KEYWORDS – Iconophotology, iconology, photography



The formation of the *virtù visiva* and the imagetic power

In the passage from the Middle Ages to modernity, it was verified, in one of the many cognitive alterations by which the human being passed, the displacement of his sensorial perception that, from auditory and tactile, became visual. Many struggles, however, were necessary for its full acceptance and understanding to be effective, at least for the various theorists who made this quarrel its object of study. Examples are not lacking in history and are not limited to the Middle Ages. From this period, for example, we can highlight the mnemonic school, whose tradition was based on oral and hearing, or St. Augustine, for whom the vision would have primacy over the other senses. If, on the other hand, we go back a little more in history, we will see that, in ancient Greece, it is possible to verify something similar. Plato (2014), for example, regarded in the **Republic** the view as perfect of sensations, while Aristotle (2012a), in **De Anima** (*On the Soul*), gave the merit of hearing, insofar as it has to do with the discourse that is the cause of learning. The Stagirite had affirmed himself, however, the opposite in his **Metaphysics** (ARISTOTLE, 2012b).

To understand how this cognitive change occurred, we take an example demonstrated by Ginzburg (1991) who, in one essay, deals with the question of sin. He points out that, by 1540, the sin most often addressed by the manuals for confessors of the Catholic Church was that of greed, followed by that of lust. It manifested itself, for example, mainly

through touch and hearing, revealing the importance of the ear in the medieval tradition, as well as the middle of the 16th century. The view, on the other hand, is hardly mentioned or warned against impudent images, because its diffusion should be minimal or nonexistent, except among the higher classes (GINZBURG, 1991).

If the imagetic diffusion – at least pictographic and sculptural – were restricted until the end of the Middle Ages to the sacred art and private life of some members of society – high clergy, nobility – it would become significant, with the advent of modernity, when it expanded its reach overwhelmingly. Thus, the predominance of the auditory truth ceases: “God speaks no more to humanity through the ear but through images” (BRANDÃO, 2009). Those reflections are verified even today: we distrust what we hear; after all, “a picture is worth a thousand words.”

Some factors were essential for the *virtù visiva* to occupy the center of human perception, favoring, valuing and expanding the imagetic employment:

- a) Alberti's perspectivism and monocular vision;
- b) the deepening of the allegory inside the society: it was sought to associate the sentences of the *auctoritas* – compiled during the Middle Ages – with images, not only to describe them but also to interpret them;
- c) the inclusion of the painters in the *ars liberae*;
- d) the Gutenberg press;



e) Protestant Reformation with its iconoclasm and the consequent catholic image advance, which will become its antipode.

Luther, when affixed his 95 theses in the church of Wittenberg, had neither obvious concern in condemning the images nor in using them in the churches – although he considered their quantity an exaggeration – he was, after all, more concerned with attacking the Pope and the sale of indulgences. However, as the Reformation became radicalized, it was out of the control of its mentor, and some of its members systematically destroyed religious images: this was the start so that the veneration of images was not only intensified but also became the higher propagandistic trump of the Catholic *status quo*, corroborated by the Council of Trent in 1563.

In one of its sessions, the intermediary function of the saints, the angels, the Virgin Mary, and the importance of images as an instrument of devotional practice in opposition to the iconoclastic protestant ideas were ratified. This recognition was based on the tradition established in the early Christian era, legitimized by the Council of Nicaea in 787, which established the threefold function of images in Christian orthodoxy:

- a) reviving the memory of historical facts;
- b) encouraging the imitation of those who were represented;
- c) allowing their veneration.

St. Bonaventure, already in the 13th century, also reiterated the use of religious imagery by the Catholic tradition, since

this derives from three causes: the lack of a culture of the simple, the laxity of affections and the impermanence of memory.

The use of images and sacred symbols by the Catholic Church has always been a constant in its trajectory, whose foundations go back to:

a) the imagetic tradition of the Roman Empire, which to represent its various gods, made extensive use of images, of which Christianity absorbed the model and the purpose – being replaced by the representations of Jesus Christ, of the Virgin Mary and the saints;

b) the proto-Church of the catacombs, when Christ is represented as the Good Shepherd (fig.1), an image that would later correspond to the crucifix. The early Christians preferred to stylize the cross, through other symbols such as the anchor, since the cross still represented disgrace, after all, it was torture applied to the outcasts of society.

Faced with the clash in which it was inserted with the advent of the Reformation, the Catholic Church already had full awareness of the image power that had perfected for centuries. It needed, therefore, to adopt an attitude of self-assertion and propaganda against a doctrine that sought to focus on the emptiness of the imaginary concreteness – external to the subject –, relying only on biblical *logocentrism*.

Iconoclast Protestants have forgotten that the *lógos* (λόγος) is also *eikón* (εἰκών), that is, image and that both have a common source, the imitation of nature. Thus, the symbolic re-representation of the



lógos could be transferred to a corresponding *eikón* – also a representation –, after all, by its means, the simpler ones would be able to minimize their limited knowledge, their inability before the whole constructed by humanity, including the mysteries of faith. Both the *lógos* and the *eikón* say something, and they are representations; the former transmits the information literally, while the latter does the same at a glance.

It should not be forgotten that as much the logocentric image as the pictorial image there is the figure of the reader who, due to his internal repertoire, is who will direct what will be possible, or not, to understand what was given. Without that collection, beautiful speeches and pictures full of details will not suffice, for understanding may not be fully realized. Language, for example, is transcended by what it reveals, and what is revealed represents its true meaning (ISER, 1999).

How to describe what is not known more efficiently than the use of an image? It makes a lot more sense when it comes to the representation of what it can or not can see that is when it comes to religious feeling and its experience: how to see what it does not know, what it cannot imagine?

Light is needed for discernment; but what was done with the iconoclastic imaginary suppression was to surround the human being of darkness so that he could, alone, try to reach the unimaginable, like a blind man who seeks to recognize the face of his familiars without being able to touch them: this is the vision of a God faceless.

However, according to Christian doctrine, God became concrete and showed his face through his *lógos* whose power is to become a real and perceptible image of that which cannot be seen because of the darkness of human smallness. If God has made himself known through his incarnate image, why cut the light that dispels the darkness of non-knowledge – whose essential element is the religious imagery, as the essence of symbolic thought - depriving the man of perceptible access to the divine employing the images themselves? That is the result of iconoclasm in abolishing the religious imagery because ending its symbolic representation, makes the relationship between reality and transcendence darker: we become symbolical beings when we observe religious images (DREHER, 2001).



Figure 1

The Good Shepherd - Priscilla's Catacomb in Rome, 3rd century, Rome

The symbolic supports present in the religious images presuppose the capacity to see in a thing what it is not, then to see it different from what it is; moreover, it appears from their employment that there is an agreement between a collectivity for its use. It thus becomes arbitrary concerning those who are alien to it – just as the sign is arbitrary – so not everyone can understand it. Standard codes and keys are needed, without which decoding is not possible; this presupposes, therefore, the ability to establish a permanent link between two terms, so that one represents the other.

That difference between being and representing minimizes the misunderstanding of the mythical, in this way the latter is used to serving as a mirror of the former that is, of the deity, because it is possible to base on the symbolic to visualizing the transcendent. In front of

the crucifix, for example, one can enter into ecstasy, although one knows that representation is not, in fact, Jesus Christ. That is why calling the Catholic images of idols is a contradiction: symbolically they establish what they want to represent, they seek to remember what was agreed to say crucified Christ, the Virgin Mary or any other saint.

Another point to note is that these sacred images are encoded according to the moment they are inserted, that is, they also participate in a social convention to which are subjected, often suffering changes in the way they are represented, especially in the West.

In the East, on the other hand, the making of icons used by the Orthodox Church still follows the same procedures of its beginning as sacred art: it is never signed, there is no external light beam that affects the image on either side, the light



must emanate from Christ himself, to represent his divinity. There is, therefore, a metaphysical interpretation of the representation of the human body, because the proportion is linked to allegorical, non-figurative aspects; valuing, thus, the allegory instead of the figuration.

In addition, our photographic standard (as an exact copy of nature, or a mimetic reality) differ from the orthodox icon; therefore, this may not reach the western theist: it does not represent the reality that one would like to see.



Figure 2

San Damiano Cross, unknown author, 13th century, Assisi

If we contemplate today the Byzantine-style Crucifix (fig. 2) of the Church of San Damiano in Assisi, without the eyes of a devotee, we are not likely to be affected. However, it was precisely the contemplation of this image, its expression and symbolic language, that St.

Francis of Assisi was led to his trance and conversion.

In this way, it is inferred that today's mimetic reality – as a mere copy and *simulacrum* of the real – could not reach the persons of the Middle Ages. His gaze was not coded to see through the window the



world in perspective (ALBERTI, 2014) after all the medieval *ratio* was transcendent, was not linked to the phenomenological world, nor to the Renaissance rationalism that would replace it.

Thus, the crucifix of San Damiano, as a representation of Christ, reflects what his readers wanted and could see. It has legitimacy before a society that is not yet interested in seeing in the crucified Christ a man of pain, but God who, despite his death, has risen.

It is corroborated, therefore, that an orthodox icon – as a sacred image – is legitimized by the culture in which it is inserted, and produces an effect on those who see in it much more than ink on a piece of wood, but the very emanation of the divine that represents. There is no reliable imitation, a copy of reality; after all, there is not the least concern with proportions, but with allegorization.

The first images of the crucified Jesus, for example, showed him with open eyes, dressed as a priest (fig 3). It is only from the 12th century onwards that pain and suffering begin to appear, reaching the height of anguish in the 17th century: we see in the crucified Christ the despair of abandonment on the cross and agony in the face of death: the church changed its focus, and perspective, images should lead to *pathos* and commotion. It is not we see in the imagetic representation of the cross of San Damiano; it would even be possible that a baroque image to be condemned by medieval society, which would not see its representation of Christ in it.

Renaissance and iconology: a bridge between Antiquity and the Middle Ages

Saying that the Renaissance was a period of artistic, economic, and scientific development, whose anthropocentric view removed the human being from **medieval darkness**, centered on a symbolic and distorted view of the world, is too simplistic. After all, a significant part of the transformations that occurred in the Renaissance period had the participation of the medieval studies. It was sought with these to rationalize the Christian faith from examples of pagan authors, although such an attitude was not a consensus among the Fathers of the Church in this quest (CURTIUS, 1996).

From this debate of ideas will form the intellectual and conceptual thinking of the Middle Ages that went through the period, passed the Renaissance, reaching the mid-18th century. Medieval theorists, for example, were not content to restrict their knowledge to a mere theological contest but to seek understanding of rhetorical figures, tropes, and other similar elements. The art, in this way, becomes indispensable to the knowledge of the Bible (CURTIUS, 1996); since it was believed that, the Holy Books had also been written in an artistic language and under grammatical and poetic norms. Thus, the authors of antiquity have become indispensable for the expansion of the knowledge of the medieval intellectuals.

Despite these constant studies, medieval scholars still could not clearly distinguish the poetry of the time of



Augustus and that of the end of antiquity, showing that they still lacked historical and critical awareness (CURTIUS, 1996). It can be demonstrated in the artistic anachronism – also found in antiquity – because human events and types from those distant ages were transferred to contemporary forms and living conditions: Caesar, Aeneas, Pilate, became courtiers; Joseph of Arimathea, bourgeois,

and Adam, a peasant of the twelfth or thirteenth century (AUERBACH, 2004).

In the Middle Ages the authors of antiquity were elevated to the rank of authority and their prestige bordered on blindness; they sought what the medieval had not yet possessed: scientific authority (at least in the contemporary sense), so they ceased to be a source of consultation and knowledge, to become a treasure of science and the philosophy of life.




Figure 3

Crucifixion, fresco, from Santa Maria Antiqua, Rome, 8th century

Many verses of ancient poets that condensed psychological experiences and

rules of life were decorated or collected in alphabetical order to be consulted



(CURTIUS, 1996); furthermore, it was believed that the works of ancient philosophers – such as Plato's – expressed revelations, even veiled, that heralded Christ's coming into the world.

All this information formed more than a collection of apothegms, constituting a nucleus of knowledge – many of which imagetic – that would serve as a basis for many precepts and explanations assimilated by the iconologies and emblem books so appreciated from the 16th century. Cesare Ripa, author of the work *Iconologia*, exemplifying his allegories, used the vast material provided by these sentences, as we can prove using his references to Homer, Horace, Ovid, Virgil, and Aristotle.

It should be remembered that it was only in the 12th century that the rediscovery and deepening of Aristotle's work began when his word reached Europe via Averroes, the most significant medieval Aristotelian Arab. Although the thought of the Stagirite was condemned, one of the greatest medieval thinkers rehabilitated him: St. Thomas Aquinas, who sought to reconcile Christian doctrine with pagan philosophical thought.

In this way – and despite the resistance by the acceptance or not of pagan doctrines by the Christianity –, from the 13th century, the philosophical and theological tradition of Saint Augustine happens to be shared along with that of Aristotle, whose principles were used by many scholars in anthologies or *Auctoritates* (NUNES, 2001). Besides, it was believed that works considered hermetic, with secret knowledge and

difficult interpretation could express hidden truths not only concerning to the Human Being but also access to divinity.

It was the reading that Renaissance theorists had made of Horapolo's work, **Hieroglyphica**, which had appeared in Florence in 1419 and which, in a short time, would become not only an intellectual desire, but also a fever that would lead to a frantic search for all that which referred to Ancient Egypt – manuscripts, papyri, obelisks. After all, it was believed, the work would be able to unravel the sign keys of the Egyptian hieroglyphs.

Thus, one can affirm that part of the Renaissance iconological thought was composed by:

- a) the collection of sentences, apothegms and *exempla* (*paradeigma*) of the *auctoritas*, compiled in the Middle Ages (CURTIUS, 1996);
- b) bestiaries and herbalists – medieval treatises on animals and plants – whose tradition dates back to the Latin versions of the Greek Physiologus;
- c) the hermetic image provided by the Egyptian hieroglyphs, derived from the work of Horapolo;
- d) the biblical images.

There was only one last link that would group all these sign systems into one: the work ***Emblematum Liber***, published by Alciati, in 1531. It gave shape to what had already been part of the European cultural environment since the beginning of the 15th century, by amalgamating all these allegorical figures from the Bible, sentences, hieroglyphs, and bestiaries, granting them, in addition to clarifying



texts, a visual form: the emblematic genre was born.

It spread and permeated much of the artworks of the period – and of the others that followed, even to the 18th century – when these images transcended the merely aesthetic and became treatises of doctrinal significations. In this way, art has surpassed what we might see as apparent realism, a method in which Renaissance (and later Baroque) art is often visualized.

Iconological reading

To corroborate this imagery used in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, and having only the work of Horapolo, an iconological reading of a work of Mantegna will be made, from the animals present in the scene (fig. 4).

It is possible to visualize, in the foreground, Peter, James, and John who sleep deeply, although they are there to watch; Jesus is above them, on a hill, standing in prayer; on the opposite side, Judas is arriving with a crowd. Here it is not proposed to make any analysis of the plastic construction of the work, but only to approach to the animals on display: a vulture, hares, and storks.

The vulture, from the top of a tree, throws its gaze to Jesus who is kneeling. Although today the bird is associated as the representation of death, since it feeds on it, it is not the iconological vision that Mantegna wants to pass, but that given by Horapolo (2011). He saw in the vulture God's representation because it needed not any pair to procreate itself (it is believed that these birds were hermaphrodite and reproduce through the

wind). Thus, the image of the vulture means that, despite the impending sacrifice, Christ is God and his sacrifice would not be in vain, for he would reunite Heaven and Earth again.

On the road to the apostles, who sleep, as well as close to Jesus, it is possible to see three hares. This animal, according to Horapolo (2011), represented the vigilance, due to the fact always to remain with the open eyes precisely what Jesus had asked of his apostles (Mt 26, 36-38). However, despite the request, the apostles fell into a deep sleep. Notwithstanding the inactivity of the apostles, there are close to the disciples three hares who are still alert, as well as the others next to Jesus, who, despite his agony, watched over him.

Opposite the apostles, it is possible to see also two storks. For Horapolo (2011), this bird represents the one who loves his father, because it cares for and respects him when he is old. Mantegna, therefore, shows us the total obedience of Jesus to the will of the Father and his complete submission (Mt 26, 39).

With the consolidation of the imagetic employment provided by the work **Hieroglyphica** de Horapolo and the following effectuation of the emblematic genre, the books of this new genre became a fever in Europe. Several editions of *the Emblematum Liber* were published, imitated and translated in such a way that European readers could get lost amidst this myriad of symbols and hieroglyphics. It is in this context that one other work appeared, published in 1593, that would be "the key to the allegories of the 17th and 18th centuries, explored by artists and



poets as illustrious as Bernini, Poussin, Vermeer and Milton” (PANOFKSY, 2004, p. 216), the **Iconologia**, by Cesare Ripa.

Ripa, therefore, would establish the necessary link for the iconology to be set as an epistemological model. For the Italian theorist, the function of his work would be a reasoned description of the images, what Panofksy would call iconography. For Ripa, however, the meaning of the word iconology was not yet clear, a fact that would only be realized after his death in the 1630 edition when it

is possible to find the etymological reference of the term.

On the cover page of his 1613 edition, Ripa had shown that his **Iconologia** would deal more than a mere compilation of images and words, his work would approach “the rules that govern them” (RIPA, 2007a, p. 45), that is, establish a methodology for the application of allegorical concepts to the most diverse ends that his society would need. For this, he opts for the Aristotelian method from Logic and Rhetoric: from former he will employ the technique of definition; from latter, the theoretical basis of metaphor.



Figure 4
Agony in the Garden, Mantegna, 1460-1465



In addition to Antiquity – Egypt, Greece, Rome –, are worthy of note in the composition of Ripa's work the material compiled during the Middle Ages – the sentences, the *exempla* –, their theorists and poets – St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Petrarca –, and the material provided by the emblematic – Ripa quotes several times Alciato.

Ripa, in the prologue of the work, cites us the maxim that says that the human being is the measure of all things, so in the image, according to the purpose established in *Iconologia*, there must be the human figure; after all, it is from her that one intends to particularize the moral contradictions. In this way, it would be inappropriate for the body from which something is defined to not appear in the proposed definition for it (RIPA, 2007a). For the Italian theorist there were two possible concepts for allegorizing:

a) the naturals, which corresponded to the images of the gods of antiquity; and

b) those inherent to the human being himself.

The naturals already had an own codification passed on by the classics: each god would correspond to one or more phenomena; those referring to the human being, could be symbolized in several ways: either individually valuing the concept or repelling it.

From that moment, the author points out how to define allegorization, based on two fundamental principles:

a) disposition, that is, the adequate physical expression of what one wants to portray;

b) quality, or the set of essential elements that differentiate something or someone (RIPA, 2007a).

Next, Ripa tells us that almost all the images drawn by the Ancients had these characteristics when they took into account the meaning of the colors and the features of the human countenance; and for this, he cites the authority of Aristotle. It is based on the Stagirite, which demonstrates the need to observe the four principles of a definition:

a) *matter*, the attributes that will constitute the foundations for the formation of allegory;

b) *efficiency*, if it is possible or not the representatively of the issue through an allegory;

c) the *form*, the construction of the image by its attributes;

d) the *purpose*, the visual perception of the abstract concept to be allegorized.

To elaborating an allegory, one should not make a simple analogy between the allegorizing idea and its symbolic attribute, which would show ingenuity, and little value, as representing *Despair* with someone with a rope tied around the neck, or *Friendship*, when one sees two people hugging each other. Furthermore, it is worth remembering that Ripa gave extreme importance to the naming of allegories, provided that it was not an enigma, because without having access to its denomination, it is not possible to reach the knowledge of what is meant (RIPA, 2007a).

Therefore, the *Iconologia* was constituted in



One of the most ambitious projects to search for the sources of personifications and allegories that came to the people of the Renaissance, without even knowing [precisely], from what cultural sphere of the Middle Ages they came. The *Iconologia* of Ripa is the work that establishes parameters that for a long time will be in force in the interpretation of the symbology of the representations (ROSA, 2007, p. 247).

The work of Ripa would become much more than a manual of images and sentences; it intended to moralize, to be a taxonomy of virtues and vices accompanied by his visual allegories. Its imagetic logic was doubly articulated, whether as a useful technique or as an interpretive technique (HANSEN, 1986). This interpretation, for example, would only be possible for those who had the sign keys that would open their doors. That would demonstrate the ingenuity of the author – who had not lost time while writing (RIPA, 2007a) – and of the reader – who would have pleasure in the contemplation of the work, and in identifying what it was intended to say (ARISTOTLE, 1996).

As Ripa (2007a) had conceived it, *Iconologia* was a manual to be observed, whose roots date back to both Antiquity and the Middle Ages; and although it was conceived in the Renaissance, it would guide the thinking of 17th century people and, upon arriving at the Age of Enlightenment, would fall into disrepute. Something that is not surprising, since part of the concepts of Ripa as well as of the emblematic was linked to the medieval *Weltanschauung*, deprecated during the Age

of Reason, including the creation of the epithet of the *Dark Ages*.

The Gutenberg press and the dissemination of the *lógos*

The *téchne* played a crucial role in the development of humanity. One sees this clearly in the future in which one is and in the face of the vertiginous transformations that are happening today. Concepts such as speed and reproducibility are a regular part of everyday life, decisive factors for the development of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, and the dissemination of new ideas and new forms of art.

The socioeconomic and cultural transformations that Europe experienced in the middle of the 15th century led the society to seek more efficient and lasting ways to register real edicts, to note costs and expenses, to follow events and diverse information, thanks to a significant sophistication and complexity social compared to the previous period. The development of papermaking, for example, has made it cheaper and more accessible, not only facilitating its use but also making it universal and promoting the access of a more significant number of people to *lógos*.

This dynamism created favorable conditions for Johannes Gutenberg to perfect the press and his metal movable-type. Such an event proved to be revolutionary since by its means the speed and reproducibility of ideas, theories, and knowledge reached a level never before seen in human society.

If in a moment the Catholic Church seemed to be the loser, after all, it was that



missed the status of the exclusive holder of human knowledge, since it was taken from it the unique power to write and keep the *lógos* – the task of the copyist monks. However, it saw the advantage to propagate its doctrine and maintain its *status quo*; it not only accepts the novelty but also will use it in various ways.

However, access to an increasing number of texts and the rapid propagation of new philosophical and religious ideas initiate constant questioning against religious hegemony itself. It was triggered discussions that would lead to the non-acceptance of the Catholic Church as the sole guardian of spiritual truth, and which would culminate not only with the Luther Reformation but also with a new, scientific view of the world.

More than questioning, the press led to expressive changes that even contributed to broaden and universalize the innovations brought by the Renaissance, such as

- a) the monocular vision (due to the spread of Alberti's theory);
- b) the dissemination of treatises and works of antiquity, which, in many cases, have been translated into the vernacular;
- c) the unprecedented propagation and dissemination of the new imagetic theory provided by the emblematic genre and the iconographic ideas of Ripa;
- d) the revolution in human being communication and its propagation that would be seen, in that amplitude, only centuries later.

With the propagation of written *lógos*, we will have the full dominance of vision. However, there were significant changes

in the social praxis, as the breaking off community interaction. The human being has replaced, slowly, listening in-group to personal reading; or the interaction of the *storyteller* – who exchanged experiences between the group – to the *speaker* – who speaks only to a group –: the realm of listening was giving way to that of seeing (BACELAR, 1999).

One can even make an analogy between this search for the individual and the boom verified by the imagetic expansion that took place in the Renaissance. Images in the Middle Ages had to address the crowd, hence the leveling of their representation. It facilitated, therefore, its direction, it would go where its sirs wanted; moreover, the idea of the individual was relative, since it was thought collective.

When one thinks of reading in the period, one must remember that the copyist monks performed their task in the privacy of the communal and study rooms of the medieval monasteries, when speaking was not always permitted. The opposite was seen in the fields, when the work was usually accompanied by music or long conversations to minimize the effort of which, often, one did not even have discernment – after all, they were conditioned to that and not see another reality.

With the advent of the press, the former task of monastic privacy gains breadth and reaches those who can afford to read both the *lógos* stamped there, as well as the images that may be coupled with it, illustrating it and being enlarged by it. The *lógos* still feels the necessity of the



eikón to firming itself and to clarifying itself, as in the process of initiation, since the written tradition, although long, was for centuries restricted to a few. Therefore, in that first moment and for this *logoiconic* rumination was possible it was necessary privacy.

The press, therefore, operated not only standardization of ideas and knowledge but it also its dissemination by several receivers scattered geographically (BACELAR, 1999). However, this uniformity should not be compared to the one there was in the Middle Age when was directed to the collective through the *eikón*, existing in the great cathedrals or even in the local churches, or of the ear; now it is directed to the individual via *lógos*. Despite this, both can indoctrinate with the difference that those who have mastery perfect of *lógos* possess greater freedom to choose, both to dominate the world and not to be dominated by it (BRANDÃO, 2013) even more so when *lógos* is involved with the *eikón*.

In a way, the Church was right to fear the press, since it opened up new possibilities for reading the world in which it is inserted and for questioning the current *status quo*. However, if there were losses on the Catholic side, there were also gains, mainly when it was found that the same *lógos* that became its strength when used by priests whose dominated oratory and rhetorical resources. The Church, however, went further and together with the *lógos*, put the *eikón* at his service. An example of this success were the Jesuits and their work around the world because the globe had barely been discovered,

there they were with their books, their cognitive ability, their images, and their paper sheets along with the entire mailing network available to order, whose function was *ad major in Glory Dei*.

The disruption of the iconological model

Time passed, and this iconological vision and employment (among them the emblematic genre) were relegated to oblivion, already in the mid-18th century. Nevertheless, the images did not dissipate, for the human being is *iconotropic* (BRANDÃO, 2014). The word, in its turn, became free from the image explanation: the *eikón* was dispensed to understand the *lógos*. The vernacular had established itself in search of more refined ways, which was found in the poetic game with its imagetic constructions, or in other genres that would come, like the romance.

Moreover, today there is no more space for iconological compendia: the world has changed, the future has arrived and time absorbs the society in a thousand ways: there is no time to lose with *charades*, one seeks artistic originality; plagiarism, for example, was already repelled in the 19th century, in Romanticism.

When *avant-garde* movements broke away from the mimetic concept in the 20th century, they opened up surprising possibilities for art making, once attached to models that were just to be followed. One could not see before Romanticism another possibility of making art did not employ the *mimesis* since that the freedom of creation was unknown: the artists were attached to their reference models.



However, when the art freed itself from the moorings of the *mimesis*, that imitation model was relegated to limbo because we dispose of not more of its iconological referentiality. Therefore, it was necessary to create another imaging source, that being unique and individual, although collective.

Thus, when encountering texts that are alien to our own *Weltanschauung*, such as of the 17th century, the reconstruction of this iconic reading is redirected to models other than those lost. In addition, because they no longer dispose of their referentiality, others are used that were constructed individually and collectively.

The 17th century texts, for example, always pointed to a predetermined iconological source, so that the game between the writer and the reader consisted in verifying the degree to which the former could make his text more ingenious for the latter, stimulating him to solve a difficulty. When this system collapses, there was an opting for the new and unprecedented, the reading of the world and its artistic exploration must be built on an ongoing basis. Something similar happens with the reading and the interpretation of images present in poems whose verses point to something, but the reader is who has to activate this relation.

It is not possible, however, to point to that which no longer exists, unless this point is replaced by a corresponding one or by what we as readers put in its place. Therefore, it is possible to activate a semantic correlation between that which was read – in this case, an extemporaneous text – with the world to which we belong.

Thus, when one reads texts from the 17th century, one will see that there is an abyss, for the established correlations will seem too artificial, causing a particular annoyance to the reader, since the images evoked do not close in cohesive links or lost in non-sense interpretations.

It breaks, therefore, the expected *protension* by the text, and the expectations concerning it. That contradicts what Gracián (1969) said, in the 17th century, concerning the satisfaction in reading “the harder it was, the nicer” (p.44). However, if this sense of pleasure was valid at that period, it was due to the sign keys that there was at that moment. Something similar cannot be said today, in particular with those extemporaneous texts, because we would have to employ an unknown referential, after all, we have not more the former iconologies as support.

An example of that situation is the image – much used in the 17th century – of the ship that sinks before reaching the harbor: but that ship is not a ship, but the life of one individual, nor the harbor is a place for anchorage, but the Paradise.

Those who still propose to teach literature in schools or even in higher education verify this reality every day: for their students, as for most people, a ship will always be a ship, never human life! Therefore, when one reading a 17th century text, it is believed to be too childish – with its simple descriptions, meaningless (after all the majority is allegorized) – or too complicated – due to the lack of capacity to open the sign keys from the allegory, to the preciousity of the



language, to the unknown words, and to its more elaborate syntax.

The interruption of the reading stream is therefore checked. This discontinuity, however, is not the same as that found in contemporary fictional texts. This breaking of the reader's expectation will reveal or not the mastery of the writer; after all, there must be something behind what we did not expect. The sequences of phrases in fictional texts should be, therefore, rich in unexpected changes, since these are, in a way, expected. Thus, the continuous stream of the sequence may even signal that there is something hidden to be revealed (ISER, 1999, p. 18).

Gracián's intended fruition – which will permeate the whole of the 17th century – consisted in the pleasure provided by the revelation of the occult ideas and by its difficulty; but for us, such delight comes much more from moments of *protension* and *retention*, when

Each correlates of enunciation consists at the same time of satisfied intuitions and empty representations. [...] When a new correlate begins to fill the empty representation of the previous correlate in the sense of anticipation, there is an increasing satisfaction of the evoked expectation (ISER, 1999, p.16).

This satisfaction, therefore, comes from the deduction of what is known to will come in a continuous act. This fruition, however, will only be possible when we are inserted within a group with which we share common ideas; otherwise, we will not decode what one other intended to transmit us, and there will be

noise in its transmission. Therefore, not only do we not get the desired fruition but also we are bored with reading.

How can this satisfaction exist today in the reading of extemporaneous texts, if it is not possible to complete the cycle in which each correlate of enunciation opens to another, from which the idea of the previous one is completed? There lies the annoyance we have with texts from the period known as Baroque because this cycle does not close. It is therefore complicated to approach the two ends, and the sign link is broken. This empty horizon will only exist if the other has also been filled previously; otherwise, the reading flow stops.

Now, if one thinks of a poetic text – often constructed by means of overlapping images that can even highlight the flashes of the unconscious of a Reader Persona – and delimit the period in which it is inserted, such as the Baroque, we will see that there may be many **voids** moments throughout his verses, not only in becoming but in verse-verse or picture-image relationships.

These voids have to be filled to maintain at least a minimum of fluency in reading. This fulfillment will occur, not with the images that belonged to that extemporaneous moment, but with others: those that belong to the contemporary reader, because

Those readers who do not share the code reproduced [in a determining moment] are faced with great difficulty in understanding the text. If the reader's point of view is coined by the conceptions of a particular historical



audience, he will only revive if we reconstruct the historical codes that this audience has mastered [...] (ISER, 1999, p. 83).

In this way, one would be added in those void spaces during the reading of extemporaneous texts – and they are empty because we lack elements with which we can fill them, due to the absence of knowledge of the presuppositions that ruled that society as the iconologies – images taken from an individual collection of the reader, that we call *iconophotological*.

Such collection would be a virtual photographic compilation we built throughout our life. That becomes necessary due to the diachronic changes the *lógos* that does not remain the same during the years since it is not amorphous and stationary matter. In this way, the images evoked by it, when they undergo diachronic symbolic modifications, will not transmit the same concept/idea that they transmitted since “each word materializes the social practice of the group or social class that uses it and that modifies it permanently in their daily life, based on their experiences” (BACCEGA, 2005, p. 2).

When we try to read texts and images of the 17th century, and for not having more of the iconological manuals available by those artists, other imagetic supports will be necessary to understand them. Therefore, those images will be replaced, adapting their data/imagetic references, not to the moment by what were made, but with a new, contemporary, trying to make them readable in the present. That will be possible through the

iconophotological collection that we have today, for the past is always updated in the present, reconfigured in new practices; also, both – present and past – serve as the base for the future planning, which is virtually contained in them (BACCEGA, 2005).

It is, therefore, to this individual imagetic stock that one has to resort to filling those empty spaces during reading. These should only indicate the significant becoming that would have to be filled based on what the author had written, and based on the reader's repertoire. Thus, due to the sign link – of the “read” with what is going to “be read” –, the idea would be glimpsed in advance, generating the fruition to seeing the not visualized yet, that is, deducing the fact before it happens. As it will usually be more difficult to fill these spaces in texts of literary moments so far from the present – for lack of those signal elements of which it is not available anymore –, this filling will be in charge of the private iconophotological collection, since that would be the collection of which available today. No longer of a collective and coerced nature, but whose scope is far greater than the rhetorical limitation imposed by the Baroque, due to the freedom of individual choice.

Iconologies were addressed to the collective – to the participants in the European aristocratic societies of the 16th and 17th centuries – from a collective cultural heritage. On the other hand, iconophotological also have a collective source, since they are extracted from the



medium in which they are inserted, but their choice is individual.

There is undoubtedly high social pressure to choose this or that image that will serve us as the paradigm, due to the power of propaganda, but not everybody lets himself or herself be imposed. Thus, although the iconophotological collection being collective, a reading made by one individual may be different from another, since the construction of the individual *Weltanschauung* tends to predominate in front of a collective. That is to say (in the thesis) that the images influence people today by if they really want, not by imposition of the political, social or economic system, although we are always being controlled and directed by them: in theory, today, nobody is obliged to anything, after all, one no longer lives in a stratified society. It is possible, even, to see constant displacements in the various social strata, including changes of *tribes*, whose members can abandon them (also in the thesis) of their own volition.

That was unimaginable in aristocratic, absolutistic and stationary society from the 17th century in which there was no individuality and freedom of choice: everybody had to fulfill a specific role, like characters in a play, whose stage was the world itself. Thus, there was no reason to complain about the task assigned to each one, since it is only enjoyed or suffered during a representation. Therefore, the topic of the **Great Theater of the World** has become an immobilizing effect of the highest effectiveness: there is no need to stand up in protest of the fate that has fallen upon anyone (MARAVALL, 1997).

The photographic image and the construction of the iconophotological model

Two centuries ago, photography revolutionized what we know by image. It is always closer and accessible to all, and this is its power: that of being everywhere and being ubiquitous. It offers itself to all, continually, so that it may have used, as an almost inexhaustible source.

Thus, the individuality and the option of choice make our iconophotology collection always different from the others, even though we live in the same society, and we are influenced together by it and by the infinity of other images that surround us. It is worth highlighting here the concepts of *punctum* and *studium* by Barthes (2015), for whom not all photographs have the same reception by the individual self, which is if somebody pays attention to one, to another goes it unnoticed.

Some photographs call attention to the detriment of others, depending on individual knowledge as well as familiarity with a particular theme. Something compels them so that, when going through them – via magazine, book, internet – one has to stop at least and contemplate them. It is through the *studium* that the reader's gaze crosses with to the photographer's gaze, as Alberti (2014) intended with his painting. Therefore, “recognizing the *studium* is fatally found the photographer's intentions, coming into harmony with them, approving them, disapproving them, discussing them [...]” (BARTHES, 2015, p. 36).



That means that, through *studium*, the photographs are read, analyzed, and interpreted traditionally. One seeks to find intentions in them, there is no display of pleasure or sorrow, but curiosity. Moreover, they are dominated insofar as are at the service of *ratio*: they can be discarded whenever they wish. The *studium* leads to reflection: was that intentional or not? Is this photo not an assembly? Something similar can be seen in the scene of the raising of the red flag in the

Reichstag by the Soviets when the fall of the Nazis (fig. 4).

In his other concept, the *punctum*, Barthes (2015) says: “it is not I who will pick it up, it is it that leaves the scene, like an arrow, and comes to sting me” (p. 35). It is through the *punctum* that specific images will be retained while others will be forgotten. When they sting us, we are compelled to stay more time in front of them, analyzing them, finding the origin of the arrow that struck us as readers.



Figure 5
Raising a Flag over the Reichstag, by Yevgeny Khaldei, 1945

That, of course, is due to several socio-cultural factors, i.e., a person whose family has an Islamic religious tradition, for example, would hardly be stung for a photograph of a Catholic mass celebrated by the already weakened Pope John Paul II; it would be probably attracted by *studium*. The same applies to a Catholic in

front of a photograph of the Western Wall or the Kaaba: the effect, as *punctum*, would be (in theory) almost nil.

Thus, while iconological images, in the 17th century, served artists and poets as *finished* epistemological models; today, it is from the photographic images, of which one would use as a *complete* imagetic



repertoire. It can be seen that the synonymy *finished* X *completed* differs, because the former is intransitive, while the latter is transitive. That is, one is enclosed in itself (the iconological model), while the other one is open (iconophotological model).

In the prosaic text, for example, the narrator is the subject of the images: he is the mediator between them and the meaning that he wants to give (GUIMARÃES, 1997). That authority could also be transferred to the reader since it will rearrange the images proposed by the author, from his world. However, if the narrator/poetic person presents something to the reader for which he is unprepared, or that is outside his field of knowledge, it will be worth little inducement since the reader will not be able to decode, as the enunciator wanted. Iser (1999) says that

Although they [the books] develop the thoughts of others, the reader is transformed during the reading in the subject of these thoughts. Thus, the division between subject and object disappears, a division so crucial to knowledge and general perception (p.85).

However, when this occurs, that is, when the subject-object fusion is broken, it is that *extrapersonal* experiences are allowed in textual reading when the reader's memory comes into play, and its iconophotological collection will permeate its reading, mainly non-contemporary texts. This fact is manifest in a poem, whose author is very distant from the

recipient because in today's writings there are still many elements of contact between the writer and the reader.

Thus, for the start of the imagetic understanding to be triggered – not only for a possible interpretation but also for its reading, even in the first instance – there must be a point of contact, a perceptual link. That is precisely in the images, the ones that “go beyond perception on all sides” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 268), but not those images lost in the distant past, which would give us pleasure in its reading if we had its reference. We have, therefore, to replace today the referential disappeared by our virtual memory formed by our iconophotological collection.

We must now us support in Foucault's words and his proposal of archeology in **The Order of Things**. In that work, he says that if no there were the obscure power of converting, through the representation, a past impression in a new in the present; no ever other would appear as similar or dissimilar to a precedent, that is, without imagination, there would be no similarity between things (FOUCAULT, 2007).

Therefore, it was only through a new representation (not in the epistemological sense that there was in the 17th century) that would be a possible reading of baroque texts and images, due to the inexistence of an accessible referential, as well as a will to do that. Thus, it turns out to be natural to close up terms, even if they do not correspond to what the author intended. The word *pearls*, for example, today have to be read merely as adornment, as jewelry, not as tears, as was



often read in the 17th century. Thus, what one reads through images that are within his reach – by imagination – would be represented, so that other relations could be established, even if incipient with the researched world, in this case, the poetic and plastic arts of a moment-specific, known as Baroque.

For Bergson (1999), the representation has to abandon something of itself so that it can represent something. Therefore, the *pearl* has to stop being a hard organic material, produced by oysters so that it can become tear, as was read in the 17th century. However, more than that, it would be necessary to suppress at a single

time what follows it, what precedes it, and what fills it, observing nothing more than its outer crust, its superficial film, isolating if possible its casing.

It does not take much for this conceptual change, this displacement of the sign, especially on the part of the poet, whose ultimate goal is precisely to play with the *lógos*. Thus, so more than isolating the object image, it should not stand out or be illuminated. After all, what is a poem if not “canvas made of words” (CARONE NETO, 1974), which open before us so that they can be visualized and pleasure us in the mold of photography?



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¹ Doutor e Mestre em Literatura pela Universidade de São Paulo (USP), pesquisador e diretor do Centro de Estudos Imagéticos CONDES-FOTÓS Imago Lab, São Paulo/Brazil, e-mail: jackbran@gmail.com